- Proponents of a liberal-individualist philosophy argued against a communitarian morality, a non-objective morality that varies from society to society. How can we, they asked, condone the caste system in India since it conforms with the ethical code there, when it is inconsistent with an objective truth. Though undeniably, liberal-individualist philosophy has raised awareness of the value of fundamental rights of the individual, it is a problematic view. It demands the state's neutrality on one hand and non-intervention of one individual in the affairs of another, on the other hand. Though proponents of liberal-individualism will deny it, by putting the individual at the center and his will as the basis of freedom and rights, this philosophy weakens man's natural inclination to live in a society and his commitment to it, and hampers society's ability to serve as his moral compass. Modern Communitarians and Their Criticism of Rawls: Modern communitarians, such as Michael Sandel opposed individualist philosophy. Sandel asserted that Rawls' theory of a social contract minus the personal interests of those forming the agreement was similar to Kant's state of 'pure reason', and that Rawls simply 'translated' Kant's theory into terms palatable to Americans today. Kant's source of moral norms, the state of 'pure reason' was compatible with the German culture of his days, but it was not, according to Sandel, compatible with twentieth century American culture. In America's business culture, the concept of a 'deal' was far more agreeable as the basis for an ethical code. Thus, according to Sandel, Rawls apparently possessed an inner moral conscience, which he sought to convey to Americans using terms that would speak to their hearts. From Rawls' own words, it is clear that he felt an affinity for Kant's theories. Thus he simply modified them for twentieth century Americans, his greatest change being the marriage of American business with Kant's objectivity. He proposed eradicating the self-interests that by nature do not lead to consideration for others or justice (just as Kant had 'eradicated' feelings and tendencies), by viewing normative questions and social principles through a 'screen of ignorance' through which those defining principles of morality do not recognize their own interests and thus all concur as to the moral fundamentals. Since this matter will be carried out under 'just' conditions, it will produce a 'just' ethical system. While a thorough critique of this theory must wait until Part V of this book, it will be noted here that it is clear that this imaginary scenario in which the participants mask their eyes and thoughts with a 'screen of ignorance', which blinds them to their inner moral and rational senses is impractical. Even Rawls never claimed that this situation could be practically implemented but rather only that man could reconstruct it in his imagination and based on his reconstruction sketch the correct principles of justice. Based on Sandel's critique, it becomes apparent that Rawls, like Kant sought 'an objective source' of morality as a kind of substitute for God. Rawls combined his modified version of Kantian philosophy with a watered down version of Hobbes' social contract. He did not speak of a constitutional social contract that establishes (like Hobbes) a new society, but rather of a means of improving a society's already existing rules. Rawls lived at a time when 'secular religion' had already taken root; therefore he was not driven by the same motive as Kant, a desire to legitimize principles of justice, which had been divorced from God, a common objective for people accustomed to the idea that truth could issue only from God or nature. Nevertheless, Rawls adopted the fundamentals of Kant's philosophy regarding the objectivity necessary in devising binding ethical rules. Ascendancy of the Community and the Social Contract vs. Ascendancy of the Individual and Liberal Individualism: Margalit's theory equates self-interests with rights, a connection likely to be drawn by modern Western philosophers (Rawls included). It views rights as the product of self-interests. People achieve rights according to their interests (whether communal or individual). The entire social system and its functioning is dictated by interests. A person's self interest is what will motivate him to seek this right and then ultimately to implement this right. A right allows the fulfillment of an interest, and an interest is protected by a right. Whoever believes in liberal-individualism, as Dvorkin depicts it (and as Barak does in his rulings) believes that at the center of man's being is a blueprint in which are linked the connections between will and right, between right and interest, between interest and will, and so on and so forth. This is in essence the opposite of Sieyes' philosophy. Instead of saying that only the will of the nation can by virtue of its very existence turn into law (or right) - Dvorkin's liberalist theory emphasizes the supremacy of the individual over the 'good' (interest) of the general society. Modern day Western communitarianism (in contrast to modern day liberal individualism) also associates man's self interest with his will. Communitarians view man as the center and purpose of ethics and morality, but since they view the individual as a social creature, they speak of the community and society. In this way both liberal individualism and communitarianism in our days relate to the tension between the supremacy of the individual's right and the 'good' (interest) of the general society. The common denominator between these two theories is the centrality of man's self interest. This is the issue that distinguishes both of these theories from an ethic based on religious Jewish faith. This will be the subject of the following chapter.